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The monetary base typically is defined as a measure of the money-supply "impulse" 
originating from the stock of high-powered, central-bank money.  In addition to 
nonbanks' demand for hand-to-hand currency, banks have demanded base money in the 
United States since 1913 to satisfy two needs.  One is a reserve need, to fulfill a Federal 
Reserve regulatory requirement. The other is an operational need, to protect against teller 
shortages of coin and currency and against daylight and overnight overdrafts of banks' 
accounts at Reserve Banks.  As the level of reserve requirements declines, the aggregate 
demand for base money originating from banks reflects reserve requirements less and 
less, and reflects operating needs more and more.  Moreover, the adjusted measure of  the 
monetary base, combining the quantity of base money with an adjustment for changes in 
reserve requirements, becomes unreliable.  It includes adjustments for banks that are, in 
fact, unaffected by changes in reserve requirements. 
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a logical model.  Defining the monetary base, therefore, might seem to be no different in 
a deregulated than in a regulated monetary system.'  However, the problem is to identify 
what kind of monetary system would exist in a deregulated world in order to know what 
institutional form the monetary base might assume. Without agreement about a monetary 
system, it is difficult to distinguish between expendable regulation and the indispensable 
legal framework of  an unregulated market system. 
This is not a normative matter, but a positive question about what kinds of 
monetary arrangements a truly free market system would produce.  According to Selgin 
and White (1  994), 
at least three strands of literature ...  can be distinguished according to the different 
sorts of payment media each predicts would predominate under laissez faire  ... 
...  a modern free banking literature that..  .proposes that an unregulated money 
and banking system would have a single distinct base money, possibly, but not 
necessarily a precious metal, and private-bank-issued monies in the traditional 
forms of banknotes and transferable deposits made redeemable in base money; 
a small but influential group of works that associate the competitive supply of 
money with parallel private fiat-type monies, that is, plural brands of non- 
commodity base money issued by private firms; 
related literatures known as the "new monetary economics" and the "legal 
restrictions theory" that envision competitive payments systems without any 
base money, with common media of  exchange consisting entirely of claims, 
paying competitive rates of return, on banks or money market mutual funds. 
One approach would be to jump into the middle of this apocalyptic tangle and 
define the monetary base along each strand, or along the "right" strand.  This paper takes 
a more pedestrian approach. It addresses the question of how successive stages of 
piecemeal deregulation affect the construction of an empirical counterpart to the a priori 
definition of  monetary base.  The first step is where we are today in the United States--in 
the midst of effectively eliminating reserve requirement regulations. Future steps might 
' Two matters of semantics:  First, many people use the phrase "monetary base" to refer to the adjusted 
base.  However, for present purposes, "monetary base" or simply "base"  will always mean unadjusted; the 
adjusted base measures of St. Louis and the Board will be designated as "adjusted base" and "break- 
adjusted base," respectively. Second, I use the word "bank" to mean "depository financial institution." 
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central bank clearing services and then eliminating central bank interbank-settlement 
services. All three steps would still fall short of the place where Selgin and White begin-- 
the disestablishment of government-fiat currency. 
The subject is largely institutional, focused as it is on the probable outcome of 
market competitors driving regulation out of business, and the probable effect of 
deregulation on the appropriate measure of the monetary base.  The approach is to 
examine the economic implications of changes in the financial sector for the proper 
measure of the monetary base. 
To explore these matters it is necessary to know what a monetary base is, how it is 
measured today, and what deregulation means.  The first section of the paper considers 
these background questions. The next section investigates the already diminishing role of 
reserve requirements in the banking system, as the first of what seem to me to be 
plausible stages of deregulation. Two major conclusions emerge.  First, as a simple 
matter of accuracy, the existing time series of the monetary base and its components 
needs to be tuned up to account for modern banking and central banking practices. 
Second, as a matter of logic and institutional fact, the two publicly available data series 
measuring the adjusted monetary base are becoming obsolete because the role of reserve 
requirements in the banking system is dimini~hin~.~  Whether these assertions can be 
verified empirically, and, if so, what to do about it, are matters for future research. 
The Concept of the Monetary Base 
Karl Brunner seems to have coined the term "monetary base" no later than his 
1961 article, "A  Schema for the Supply Theory of Money."  His intent there was to 
develop a supply function of money, starting from the microfoundation of an individual 
bank managing its cash position in the context of settling customers7  payments.  The 
result was an aggregate theoretical relationship in which, as he summarized it, "[tlhe 
money stock is explained in terms of some component of the public's demand functions 
for currency and time deposits, the monetary base adjusted for the cumulated reserve 
2  One of these data series is published by  the Federal Reserve Board, the other by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis. 
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demand for Federal Reserve Money" (italics added).  That is7  the money stock was a 
function of the monetary base (adjusted for changes in the effective reserve requirement) 
and of certain demand factors determined by institutional practices, preferences, and 
market conditions. 
At about the time Brunner was writing, Gurley and Shaw (1960) coined the phrase 
"outside money" to fit a similar definition.  As the phrase implies, their focus was on 
nonmarket control of the money-supply impulse of the monetary base.  They specifically 
excluded from outside money any funds that the monetary authority loaned directly to 
banks.  For the same concept, James Tobin (1961) used the more cumbersome name "net 
non-interest-bearing government debt."  Distinguishing between gross and net monetary 
base sometimes has been a significant issue.  In the United States, the difference arises 
from the discount window at which the Federal Reserve Banks will lend base money, 
essentially on demand in the very short run.  As a result, the gross volume of the 
monetary base, while entirely high-powered, may not be entirely within the precise 
control of the monetary authority. 
Within two years of Brunner's article, Friedman and Schwartz published their 
Monetary History (1963), emphasizing the monetary-base concept as one of the 
proximate determinants of the money stock. What's more, they provided an actual time- 
series measure of the stock of base money in the United States covering almost an entire 
century, albeit without adjusting for changes in reserve requirements. Instead of calling 
their measure the "monetary base," however, they used the old-fashioned designation, 
"high-powered money."  They traced this phrase back to the 1936 second edition of The 
Reserve Banks and the Money Market, by W. Randolph Burgess, a long-time officer of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and brother-in-law of Leonard P. Ayres, the 
celebrated prewar economic guru of the Cleveland Trust Company (Friedman and 
Schwartz [1963]; Boone [1944]). The concept of high-powered money, with associated 
multiple expansion and contraction of bank deposits, was not new in 1936, however. 
Tom Humphrey (1992) has traced the notion back another 110 years, through 
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Pennington in 1826. 
Within seven years of  Brunner's article, Leonall Anderson and Jerry L. Jordan 
(1968) devised a time-series measure of the monetary base adjusted for changes in reserve 
requirements. They emphasized the need to define a single, unified measure for tracking 
the monetary policy impulse of the central bank, observing that "the Federal Reserve, by 
varying the supply of the monetary base, causes commercial banks and the nonbank 
public to adjust their spending on real and financial assets so as to bring the amount 
demanded of the base into equilibrium with the amount supplied.  In the course of these 
adjustments, the path of  economic activity is affected."  The St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Bank has been publishing this measure for 27 years, with occasional revisions because of 
changes in data availability and monetary institutions. 
It was not until eighteen years after Brunner's article, eleven years after Anderson 
and Jordan, and after some prodding by the blue-ribbon Advisory Committee on 
Monetary Statistics, that statistical tables in the Federal Reserve Bulletin began including 
a monetary-base measure, slightly different from the St. Louis mea~ure.~  If the Fed's only 
influence were as the source of base money, a time series measured at the source would 
record that influence. Karl Brunner, Anderson and Jordan, and the Board all reasoned, 
however, that changes in reserve requirements would alter the monetary impulse of a 
given quantity of base money.  A time series would give more useful, direct readings of 
the monetary impulse if it were corrected for changes in reserve requirements. 
Initially, the Board's base had no adjustments for changes in levels of reserve 
requirements or methods of computation and maintenance, but as the months went by, 
footnotes appeared, containing data with which users might adjust for such changes. 
Then, in January 1981, again without comment, the current "break adjusted monetary- 
Members of the committee, appointed by the Board in 1974, included George Leland Bach (Stanford), 
Phillip D. Cagan (Columbia), Milton Friedman (Chicago), Clifford G. Hildreth (Minnesota), Franco 
Modigliani (MIT) and Arthur Okun (Brookings). See "Improving the Monetary Aggregates," Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Monetary Statistics, Washington, D.C., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, June 1976. For an explanation of the Board of Governors' monetary base series, see "Reserves of 
Depository Institutions," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (mimeo), March 1995. 
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measure and Karl Brunner's original concept, the Board's version of the base was 
adjusted for changes in the structure of  reserve requirements.4 
These four concepts--monetary base, outside money, net non-interest-bearing 
government debt, and high-powered money--all represent variants of the same core idea. 
The Federal Open Market Committee controls the volume of  central-bank money in the 
fiat money regime of  the modem United States. This is high-powered money that can be 
used as reserve assets backing reservable bank deposits.  It is also outside money, the 
liability of an institution outside the private sector.  Until 1980, high-powered, outside 
monetary base was the non-interest-bearing debt of  the federal government, because the 
Federal Reserve Banks paid no explicit interest on either their currency or deposit 
liabilities.  Since the Monetary Control Act of  1980, however, some of  the deposit portion 
of the high-powered, outside monetary base explicitly yields interest in the form of credits 
that can be used to pay for Reserve Bank services.  No longer is it true that the high- 
powered, outside monetary base is the equivalent of non-interest-bearing federal 
government debt. 
Degree of control has been another matter of interest in isolating an outside 
monetary impulse that is exogenous to, or determined independently of, market forces. 
The Federal Reserve's willingness to lend means that the monetary base can be an 
endogenous variable.  For example, as market interest rates rise relative to the discount 
rate, banks can be expected to overcome some of their bashfulness about being in debt to 
the authorities. This has suggested that only the nonborrowed base should be viewed as 
the exogenous variable, an indicator of the outside control exercised by  the monetary 
authority. 
I was an imperfectly informed participant-observer of the Federal Reserve System at that time, but my 
recollection is that the Board staffs apparent reluctance to produce a measure of the monetary base was 
more than sour grapes.  True, there might have been some reaction to the success of the St. Louis research 
department in popularizing an implementable form of monetarism.  However, the real reluctance was more 
a reflection of the Board's growing involvement in large-scale, aggregate econometric models of the 
economy and the application of control theory to the policy process.  A single summary time series index of 
the money supply impulse simply was out of place in the more elegant system of demand and supply 
equations. 
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Anderson and Jordan published the first St. Louis adjusted-base series, Patric Hendershot 
published estimates of what he called the "neutralized money stock."  His idea was to 
measure the central bank's monetary impulse purified of the influence of shifts in 
demand, whether from changes in reserve requirements or from cyclical income 
variations.  The neutralized money stock would measure the extent to which the monetary 
authority was raising or lowering the trend growth rate of money.  Since that time, with 
the development and estimation of large structural and multiplier models of the economy, 
and later of rational expectations models, measuring exogenous actions of the monetary 
authority has moved to the residuals from a rationally perceived reaction function, far 
from the simple nonborrowed adjusted monetary base. 
Deregulation 
The American economy teems with regulations.  In searching for those regulations 
whose extinction would be relevant to the monetary base, it is helpful to differentiate 
between the Reserve Banks as sources of assets held by the banking and nonbanking 
public, and the reserve accounting regulatory framework that governs the uses of the base. 
Interest in reconstructing the base comes on both fronts.  New sources, for example, 
might come from the unregulated emergence of stored-value cards.  Suppose that 
software providers, brokerage houses, or travel- and entertainment-card companies were 
to act as warehouses of funds stored on their branded cards but not yet spent at the many 
merchants who would accept them.  Unless these warehouse facilities maintained 
100 percent reserves in central-bank money, stored value might be considered another 
type of base money, fully commensurate with high-powered bank reserves.  After all, they 
might be better than deposits at the Fed in being generally acceptable, and better than 
Federal Reserve notes in being electronically transferable in making anonymous 
payments. 
However, concerns about deregulation are more often based on new uses.  This is 
the realm in which the probability of movement toward a deregulated monetary system 
seems very high.  Actually, this would be "further movement," for it would simply 
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and World War 11. 
Interest-rate controls are gone. The prohibition of  interest on demand deposits 
remains on the books, but has been rendered largely ineffective by the long-standing 
banking practice of  implicit interest payments on compensating balances and by the more 
recent introduction of sweep accounts and interest-bearing NOW accounts. 
As to the future, consider the following: 
Current efforts to repeal Glass-Steagall restrictions on bank powers involve 
serious debate about how significant a role the Federal Reserve Banks should 
retain in supervising and examining financial institutions, one of their long- 
standing functions. 
Repeated efforts have been made to eliminate the role of  Federal Reserve 
Bank presidents on the Federal Open Market Committee. These efforts surely 
will continue. 
The Monetary Control Act of  1980 requires the Federal Reserve Banks to 
price their services to recover full cost, including imputations for interest on 
long- and short-term funding and return on capital at levels comparable to 
those of private competitors. The imperative to cover costs, plus 
technological changes such as securities depositories and regulatory changes 
such as nationwide branching, raise serious questions about the continued 
viability of the traditional check, ACH, Fedwire, and noncash-collection 
product lines offered by the Federal Reserve Banks.  Without vigorous new 
approaches to serving the needs of present and potential customers, the decline 
of Reserve Banks' market share in payment services seems unlikely to stop. 
Pressure from private suppliers poses a similar competitive threat to the 
Reserve Banks as fiscal agents for the United States government. 
Traditionalists seem to assume that the Treasury is somehow required to use 
the Reserve Banks for all services, but this is not so.  Price competition for the 
government's business is intense, and, as the recent episode involving bidding 
for electronic funds-transfer of tax payments may demonstrate, products 
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Banks, regardless of price. 
These forces suggest that the Federal Reserve Banks, and therefore the central-bank 
balance sheet, are not necessarily permanent features on the financial landscape, no 
matter how enduring the Federal Reserve Act might seem.  Erosion of each of the 
Reserve Banks' four basic functions--banking supervision, monetary policy, payments 
services, and fiscal agent--is more than conceivable; it is the default mode in which 
Reserve Banks already operate.  Moreover, a good case can be made that erosion in any 
one of the four areas would increase the likelihood of erosion in the others.  Therefore, it 
is productive to focus discussions of deregulation on stages in the process of statutory or 
competitive elimination of the bankers' banks. 
Reserve Requirement Deregulation 
Deregulation is worth thinking about because it has been happening and is likely 
to continue.  One of its aspects has been the erosion of reserve requirements as a factor 
constraining the behavior of banks, accompanied by a decline in the percentage of the 
monetary base needed by banks to satisfy reserve requirements. 
The dominant source of base money in the United States today is the balance sheet 
of the Federal Reserve Banks, whose purchases of assets in large part create monetary 
liabilities of two sorts--banks'  deposits at the Fed and Federal Reserve notes held both by 
banks and by the nonbank public.  Twenty years ago, this central-bank money was only 
used as currency in the hands of the public and as reserve assets of the banking system 
(vault cash and deposits at Reserve Banks).  Over the intervening years, reserve assets 
have shrunk from 37 percent to 14 percent of the monetary base, reflecting both the 
growth of foreign holdings of U.S. currency and the decline of reserve requirements 
(figure 1). Moreover, with growing use of currency and vault cash, reserve deposits, 
taken alone, have declined from 30 percent of the base to less than 6 percent today. 
Meanwhile, two additional uses of central-bank money have emerged (figure 2). 
Surplus vault cash now amounts to about 10 percent of total vault cash.  This 
is vault cash that is not applied to meeting reserve requirements by those 
banks that meet the entire requirement with vault cash. 
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total deposits at Federal Reserve Banks.  These are balances maintained in 
addition to required reserves to support operational needs.  The Federal 
Reserve calls them "service-related balances" or "required clearing balances." 
Banks use their surplus vault cash to meet operational needs during the day and at 
ATM machines at night.  Investing the surplus overnight is either impossible or 
unprofitable. Clearing balances are a different story.  Although readily available for 
overnight investment, they are not invested in the market.  Instead, a bank contracts with 
a Reserve Bank to maintain a specified average overnight clearing balance during a 
reserve-maintenance period.  This balance is not segregated in a unique account, but 
supplements whatever average reserve deposit balance the bank is required to maintain in 
a unified account over the same period. The result is a combined balance with a target 
level that the bank deliberately has set higher than reserve-requirement regulations 
specify. 
A contractual clearing balance has two benefits for a bank.  One is that the 
Reserve Bank pays interest on clearing balances--at the level of  the federal funds rate--in 
the form of earnings credits a bank can use (instead of  hard dollars) to pay for Reserve 
Bank services.  This feature alone does not explain why banks would use this roundabout 
method to pay for services.  Clearly, however, earnings credits do make a clearing 
balance more palatable. 
The real benefit of  a clearing balance is that it reduces the cost of operating in an 
uncertain transactions environment (Stevens, 1993a, b).  A bank doing a significant 
volume of business with its Reserve Bank could find it costly to target a zero overnight 
balance in its account, or a balance low enough to avoid wasting reserves.  The Reserve 
Banks penalize overnight overdrafts and charge fees for excessive daylight overdrafts. 
Uncertainty, however, prevents a bank from controlling its overnight balance precisely, 
and from predicting the intraday sequence of  debits and credits to its ac~ount.~  The 
Until the mid-1980s, the intraday sequence of debits and credits was of little practical concern.  The 
Reserve Banks had to permit unlimited daylight overdrafts because their deposit-accounting system made 
tracking intraday positions almost impossible.  Over the past decade, however, the Reserve Banks have 
upgraded their accounting systems and now monitor the daylight overdrafts of each bank (ex post, in most 
cases) relative to a ceiling above which fees are assessed. 
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daylight overdraft limit during the day, to be overdrawn at the close of business or forced 
into last-resort borrowing. 
The American banking system is in the midst of  a massive migration of banks 
from a regulatory to an operational demand for balances at the Reserve Banks. The large 
deposit balances demanded by  high reserve requirements reduce the risk of daylight and 
overnight overdrafts. Meeting a very high reserve requirement may involve more than 
enough cash to cover operational needs. A low reserve requirement, on the other hand, 
can make a required reserve balance objective redundant.  Maintaining an operational 
balance sufficient to ensure against overdrafts may involve more than enough cash to 
meet reserve requirements. 
The growing significance of banks' operational demands for base money relative 
to the demands imposed by reserve requirements is consistent with the downward trend of 
required reserve ratios from their peak levels shortly after World War 11, before banks 
were allowed to use vault cash to satisfy requirements.  Requirements today are both 
lower and less complex than in days past (table 1). In 1995, the required reserve ratio 
was zero on all of a bank's liabilities except transactions deposits in excess of $4.2 
million, was only 3 percent on the next $50 million of transactions deposits, and only 10 
percent on amounts above $54.2 milli~n.~ 
Even among large depository institutions (the 7,500 that report data to the Fed 
weekly), 68 percent either operated below the $4.2 million floor or met their entire 
requirement with the cash they held at teller stations, in automated teller machines, and in 
their vaults (table 2).  Another 20 percent had such low reserve requirements that they 
contracted to hold clearing balances in addition to the vault cash and deposits they needed 
to meet reserve requirements.  Only about 900 banks, representing  just 12 percent of 
those reporting weekly (but 38 percent of deposits at large banks), actually seemed to be 
constrained by reserve requirements.  This relatively small group of banks met 
These dollar amounts are not fixed. Law requires that both the zero and the 3 percent ceilings be adjusted 
annually by  80 percent of  the prior year percentage increase in total reservable liabilities of all depository 
institutions. 
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need for additional operating balances. 
Monetary-Base Data 
Basic Data  Contractual clearing balances are reducing the precision of 
monetary-base data.  Published Federal Reserve estimates of the monetary base do not 
distinguish entirely between reserves, both total and excess, and clearing balances.  This 
occurs because the deviation of any bank's clearing balance from the contractual level, 
whether above or below it, is included in excess reserves, rather than added to or 
subtracted from contractual clearing  balance^.^ 
Measured excess reserves today might better be called "odds and ends." 
Conceptually, under current reserve accounting regulations and in the absence of a 
contractual clearing balance, the excess reserves of a single bank might be thought of as 
wasted balances, that is, balances in-excess of the sum of the amounts used to meet the 
current period requirement, to carry forward to meet next period's requirement, and to 
carry back to offset a reserve deficiency in the previous period. In fact, however, not only 
do excess reserves include wasted reserves, but also the amount of balances some banks 
carried back to the last period, net of the amount that other banks carried forward from 
the last period, plus the amount of balances some banks carried forward to the next 
period, net of the amount that other banks carried back from the next period. 
In addition to the inclusion of balances used to meet requirements by carryover, 
measured excess reserves also include some nonreserve factors. This occurs because of 
the inclusion of the aggregate difference between each bank's actual and contractual 
clearing balance.  Some of these difference are within the plus or minus 2 percent range 
that is a bank's allowable, penalty-free band for maintenance of its clearing balance. 
While allowable as a clearing balance, this difference is included in aggregate excess 
reserves.  A difference larger than plus or minus 2 percent is not allowable, being 
'  Banks contract to hold a specific amount of clearing balances over and above their required reserves 
during a reserve maintenance period. The reserve-accounting system defines required reserve balances as 
the difference between required reserves and predetermined applied vault cash. Actual reserve balances are 
defined as total balances (from the Reserve Banks' balance sheet), minus contractual clearing balances. 
Excess reserves are derived as the difference between actual and required reserve balances. 
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excesses and deficiencies of actual from contractual clearing balances are included in 
measured excess reserves. 
Constructing more precise aggregate data series would not involve any change in 
the micro data gathered from banks.  These already allow the Reserve Banks to make an 
exact calculation of each depositing bank's average position over a maintenance period,  - - 
to administer reserve requirements, calculate earnings credits, and, when necessary, 
assess penalties.  The total amount allocated between reserve and clearing balances 
includes each bank's total position during a maintenance period, consisting of applied 
vault cash plus deposit balance at the Reserve ~ank.~  It also includes all deficiencies or 
surpluses in surrounding periods that are carried forward or back one period to offset 
excesses or deficiencies in a bank's reserve position. 
Allocating positions between reserve and clearing balances must begin with an 
assumption about priority.  That is, if a bank's total position is inadequate after adjusting 
for carryover, should the bank be penalized for a reserve deficiency or for a clearing- 
balance deficiency?  Current Reserve Bank practice gives first priority to meeting reserve 
requirements, so that deficiencies are first attributed to clearing balances.  No deficiency 
in a reserve position can occur as long as a bank maintains the least portion of a clearing- 
balance contract. 
In the alternative case, where a bank's total position exceeds its required reserves, 
that required amount can be included in the reserves component of the base.  The excess 
of a bank's position above required reserves, up to the interest-bearing maximum of 
102 percent of its contractual clearing balance, can be included in the clearing-balance 
component of the base.  When a bank's position exceeds required reserves plus 
102 percent of its contractual clearing balance, however, another priority assumption 
must be invoked. The redundant balance could be included in the bank's reserve position 
(especially for banks without contractual clearing balances), or in its clearing balance 
-- - 
'  I pass over the distinction between the source base (current-period Reserve Bank assets minus 
nonmonetary liabilities and capital) and the use base (essentially, current-period currency in the hands of the 
nonbank public, surplus vault cash, bank deposits at the Reserve Banks, plus applied vault cash).  For a 
detailed examination of the construction of the St. Louis and Board measures, see Garfinkel and Thornton 
(1991). 
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instead of making an arbitrary allocation, the redundant position might be aggregated and 
reported as surplus balances, analogous to the current treatment of surplus vault cash. 
Reserve Adjustments The Board of Governors' monetary base data series, which 
is not break-adjusted, includes actual clearing balances, although these are not identified 
separately. The Board's break-adjusted base series includes an estimate of how much 
lower the monetary base would have been, had today's low reserve requirements been in 
force in the past.  However, clearing balances are excluded from the break-adjusted 
measure. This does not seem appropriate. Some of the impact on reserve demand of the 
secular decline in reserve requirements to today's low level has been offset by an 
increased demand for clearing balances to meet operational needs that formerly were met 
with reserve deposits. The Board's procedure makes the break adjustment too large when 
comparing present values of the adjusted base with values at dates prior to the 
introduction of current clearing-balance arrangements. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis excludes contractual clearing balances 
from its unadjusted ("source") base, as well as from the adjusted base.  The difference 
between the adjusted and unadjusted series--the reserve adjustment magnitude--includes 
the difference between the current level of required reserves and what the current level 
would have been, had the reserve requirements of a past base period been in force. This 
adjustment also is not entirely appropriate. It is too large, failing to account for the fact 
that today's required reserve should include an allowance for clearing balances that have 
been substituted for reserve deposits. 
In both cases, adjustments to the raw monetary base may do a fine job of 
indicating what required reserves would have been in the past, had today's reserve 
requirements been in place (Board), or what today's required reserve would be today, had 
past reserve requirements been.in place (St. Louis). However, these adjustments seem 
less and less likely to produce an adjusted monetary base that is a consistent time-series 
The staff of the Board of Governors regularly prepares a report for internal use that uses these definitions 
and then prorates each bank's redundant position between reserve balances and clearing balances on the 
basis of the relative amounts of each deposit required. 
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the defining reason for measuring the monetary base.  At one time, the impact of 
changing a reserve ratio might have been limited to changes in the reserve constraint on 
the expansion of reservable deposits.  Increasingly, however, the reserve requirement is 
not the operative constraint on the expansion of deposits. 
Defining the Monetary Base 
The possibility that reserve requirements are not a significant constraint for most 
of the country's large banks suggests the nature of the immediate problem with empirical 
representations of the monetary base: The base is intended to gauge the money-supply 
impulse, which comes from the supply of base money relative to its demand.  It matters 
not whether demand is created by regulation through reserve requirements, or through 
business needs for operational balances--only that there be a demand. 
Measures of adjusted monetary base are designed to combine readings of two 
policy tools into a single money-supply indicator.  A cut in a required reserve ratio can be 
thought of as reducing the immediate need for reserve assets (or, in Karl Brunner's 
phrase,  "liberating" reserve deposits).  The extra reserve deposits would have to be 
soaked up to avoid the money-supply stimulus of this liberation. 
Historically, the Federal Reserve could use open-market sales of securities to 
absorb reserves liberated by cutting reserve requirements.  The concept of an adjusted 
monetary base was designed for this situation. The adjustment is intended to purify a 
monetary-base time series from the effect of the hypothetical open-market operations that 
would have sterilized the money supply of the effects of changes in required reserve 
ratios. 
Of course, if there were no money-supply "kick" from changing reserve 
requirements, then the base adjustment would be inappropriate.  And that is where the 
American banking system has been headed.  If reducing reserve requirements induces 
banks to contract for larger clearing balances, then those extra clearing balances soak up 
some or all of the "kick" to the money supply. Reducing the required reserve ratio 
doesn't reduce the demand for balances; it merely changes their classification from 
"reserve" to "clearing."  Under these circumstances, adjusting the monetary base for 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9514.pdf"cumulated reserve liberations" will not provide a better gauge of a money-supply 
impulse. 
A perpetual downward trend in required reserve ratios almost guarantees that this 
second method of soaking up liberated reserves will be employed.  Only if banks have 
absolutely no need for operating balances could an adjusted monetary base continue to be 
a useful gauge of the money-supply impulse as the downward trend of reserve 
requirements continues. If there is a positive demand for operating balances, however, 
reserve requirements eventually will become low enough to be irrelevant. With 88 
percent  of large banks targeting reserve positions larger than the regulatory requirement, 
arrival at that point seems imminent. 
It is easier to indicate the potential error in these adjusted base measures than it is 
to suggest a specific, immediate remedy.  Unfortunately, factoring clearing balances into 
a break- or reserve-adjustment magnitude will not be as straightforward as applying 
today's reserve ratio to yesterday's reservable deposits, or yesterday's reserve ratio to 
today's reservable deposits. The required ratio of reserve assets to reservable deposits 
remains constant until an administrative change is announced. The desired ratio of 
contractual clearing balance to deposits is a behavioral variable. It will evolve over time, 
much as do the currencyldeposit and transaction/nontransactiondeposit ratios, and is 
likely to vary with the level of the funds rate.'' 
Conclusion 
The monetary base is defined as the money-supply impulse originating from the 
stock of central-bank money.  Deregulation poses a problem for this definition if it 
eliminates the demand for central-bank money.  Likewise, the definition remains useful as 
long as there remains a demand for central-bank money with sufficient interest and 
income elasticities to make central bank monetary policy an "important" influence on all 
other market outcomes in the economy. 
Currency in the hands of the public represents the lion's share of the monetary 
base.  This demand is not in obvious peril from deregulation. True, demand for currency 
lo This is to be expected.  A balance that earns just enough to pay service charges at low interest rates will 
earn too much at higher rates. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9514.pdfshould continue to suffer competitive erosion from the substitution of checks and ACH, 
credit, debit, and ATM cards, and (it is predicted) from cybermonies and smart cards. 
However, more immediately, currency demand has been vastly inflated by foreign users. 
This is not a definitional problem, but an analytic challenge to distinguish the domestic 
from the foreign money-supply impulse of the monetary base. 
Banks7  demand for central-bank money, on the other hand, has eroded 
substantially because of deregulation in the form of lower reserve requirements. 
Moderating this decline, demands for vault cash and for clearing balances have emerged 
as important sources of banks' demands for central-bank money.  These demands for 
central-bank money should not dry up as long as banks and the central bank dominate the 
payments mechanism, for it is the payments function that creates the demand. 
Deregulation may not affect the definition of the monetary base, but it already has 
exposed deficiencies in current measures of  the monetary base.  Linkages between 
demand for base money and broader monetary aggregates can be less rigid.  Perhaps the 
base will be more closely linked to the flow of economic activity, but that is sheer 
speculation. In any case, the determinants of money multipliers and income multipliers 
should be expected to change. 
In the future, measuring a money-supply impulse from changes in the stock of 
central-bank money is likely to involve more sophisticated models than the somewhat 
mechanical reserve-adjustment and break-adjustment magnitudes devised in the past. 
Both of the available measures employ exaggerated adjustments for changes in reserve 
requirements. Unfortunately, however, the raw data are collected and presented in an 
outdated classification framework that precludes the ready estimation of better models. 
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The Declining Level and Complexity of Reserve Requirements 
December 31,1948  December 31,1975  June 30,1995 
Demand Deposits  Demand Deposits  Transactions Deposits 
Amount of  Amount of 
Location of  Required  deposits:  Required  deposits:  Required 
bank  reserve ratio  (million)  reserve ratio  (million)  reserve ratio 
-------------  -------------  -------------  -------------  -------------  ------------- 
Central  26.0%  > $400  16.5%  > $54.2  10.0% 
Reserve City 
Reserve City  22.0%  > $100  13.0%  > $  4.2  3.0% 
Country  16.0%  >$ 10  12.0%  c $  4.2  0 
.................................  .................................  ................................. 
Time  Time  Time 
Deposits  Deposits  Deposits 
All banks  7.5%  Size of  All banks  0 
deposit and 
maturity: 
> $5 million 
c  180 days  6.0% 
c  4 years  3.0% 
>  4 years  1.0% 
c $5 million 
c  4 years  3.0% 
>  4 years  1.0% 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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Use of Clearing; Balances, May 1995 
(percent of weekly reporting banks) 
Required  Required 
reserve  reserve 
Applied  exceeds  exceeds 
vault cash  applied vault  applied vault 
exceeds  cash; no  cash; with 
No applied  No required  required  clearing  clearing 
vault cash  reserve  reserve  balance  balance 
Characteristic  (percent of total) 
Number of  1.3  8.2  59.6  11.6  19.3 
banks 
Reservable  1.4  4.0  20.0  37.7  36.8 
deposits 
Required 
reserves  0.3  0  6.4  52.8  40.6 
Contractual 
clearing 
balances  1.9  2.2  21.1  0  74.8 
Reserve 
deposits  0.7  0  0.001  58.3  41.0 
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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Millions of dollars 
450 7 
COMPONENTS OF THE MONETARY BASE 
(not seasonally adjusted, not adjusted for changes in reserve requirements; 
1  2-month moving average) 
Clearing balances 
I  * ex*  $  A 
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
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Millions of dollars 
-  - 
COMPONENTS OF THE MONETARY BASE, EXCLUDING CURRENCY 
(not seasonally adjusted, not adjusted for changes in reserve requirements; 
12-month moving average) 
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
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